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Society has widely adopted use of electronic data 
without sufficient attention to the problems of non-
repudiation (NR). A universal, transparent scheme is 
needed to replace the traditional paper-based model 
that people are familiar with. A registration scheme 
is  proposed  that  uses  a  network  of  registration 
servers  run  in  a  way  that  is  robust  to  legal  and 
technical challenge. Any user can register potential 
electronic  evidence  with  one  or  more  of  these 
servers. This enables a user to later assert that they 
had  the  data  at  the  time.  Applications  encompass 
intellectual property (IP) protection, file-download-
based e -commerce  and  corporate  shareholder 
communications.  Wide  availability  should  induce 
proper behaviour between parties whether they use 




Traditional, paper-based methods of working are 
being gradually overtaken by the exchange of data in 
electronic  form.  This  pervades  all  that  we  do  now 
both as ordinary citizens and as people at work. Most 
have  not  appreciated  that  doing  business 
electronically  is  not  just  an  analogue  of  the  paper 
model. Even fax was still anchored on paper since 
there was a requirement that there be an original.  
Society is fast embracing web-based methods of 
doing business. There is rarely any durable, shared, 
original paper document whose content determines a 
future decision. It works by the parties setting a trust 
threshold by making a risk assessment. So far there 
have  not  been  any  widely-known  incidents  where 
this trust has been seriously undermined. However, 
there is a problem that needs attention. Such socially-
useful,  electronic  communication  systems  must 
embody easy-to-use, legally-robust, trust-supporting 
mechanisms. 
The recent near-collapse of banking systems is a 
warning. Those trying to recover their assets may be 
finding  the  voids  in  the  current  trust  mechanisms. 
Typically,  the  only  evidence  the  claimant  would 
have, if on paper at all, would be their own printout 
of data purporting to be from the disputing party. 
A key concept in doing business is that each party 
declares its position in a way that is non-repudiatable 
(NR). The subsequent action by the counterparty is 
constrained if it knows that NR techniques are in use. 
Proper behaviour is induced because of the implicit 
threat of legal action using robust, NR evidence. In 
the past this state would be captured on paper and 
openly  marked  (signed)  by  those  bound  by  its 
content.  When  the  parties  become  virtual  and 
timeliness  is  crucial,  some  other  mechanism  is 
required. Maintaining trust in these circumstances is 
the challenge. Fax worked: it emulated sealed post, 
but technology and society have moved on.  
Intellectual  property  (IP)  records  are  not  so 
obviously the basis of a contract but they are subject 
to  the  same  standards  of  evidence.  Today, 
experimental  data  is  extensive  and  electronic  and, 
when created, it is not clear what elements may be 
important. The ‘log book’, electronic or paper, is not 
suitable  anymore.  There  needs  to  be  a  robust  and 
economical way of enabling NR over all of this data.  
 
2. Trust requirements 
 
A  court  is  bound  by  its  rules  of  evidence. 
Electronic  evidence  has  had  difficulty  in  being 
regarded as reliable, and demonstrating its robustness 
is  still  a  challenge.  Accordingly,  any  business 
transacted on the basis of electronic evidence is more 
at risk. Transactions still resort to paper when their 
level of risk demands robust evidence. 
A way of creating reliable evidence is to have it 
widely witnessed at the time it crystalises. We are 
familiar  with  signing  ceremonies  to  mark  the 
acceptance  of  a  significant  contract,  agreement  or 
treaty.  This  exploits  the  mechanism  of  ‘open 
declaration’  to  effect  NR,  often  assisted  using  the 
media. Most of those observing will not know the 
content of the agreement: the trust exists because the 
mechanisms  are  executed  openly  and  are  easily 
understood. Future reputations and business depend 
on a successful outcome. 
Contract and IP data often need to be confidential. 
When  electronic,  the  physical  control  mechanisms familiar  with  paper  are  not  so  easy  to  enforce, 
particularly within networked, virtual communities. 
Encryption  of  electronic  data  is  technically  well-
understood  but  still  not  easily  useable.  Encryption 
can support NR but, as will be shown, NR does not 
require  the  use  of  encryption.  NR  is  also  agnostic 
regarding the meaning of the data, encrypted or not. 
A  dispute  signifies  a  breakdown  in  trust  that 
needs to be reestablished. The evidence is required in 
order  to  openly  replay  the  circumstances  that  are 
relevant to the dispute. All those involved (in court, 
jury  and  observers)  must  be  convinced,  beyond 
reasonable doubt, of each of the steps taken to reach 
a verdict. Before this, just the availability of robust 
evidence can shorten or even preempt a dispute. If 
the  means  of  creating  robust  evidence  is  readily 
available,  then  society’s  trust  foundations  will  be 
sounder.  The  result  will  be  doing  business 
confidently, faster and with fewer, costly disputes. 
 
3. Current schemes 
 
The  idea  of  using  cryptographic  hashing 
algorithms  to  assist  time-stamping  a  digital 
document was published by Haber and Stornetta [2]. 
The motivation was the ability to easily declare the 
existence  of  a  document  to  a  third  party  without 
disclosing  its  content.  Cryptographic  hashing 
algorithms are designed to produce a short 'digest' (or 
'hash')  of  a  digital  document  (file)  which  is  (a) 
collision-free i.e. no two documents will generate the 
same digest and (b) it is infeasible to synthesise a 
collision i.e. generate another document that has the 
same  digest  as  another.  Since  the  digest  is,  in 
general, shorter than the original document, there is 
less information there than in the original. Together 
with the nature of the algorithm, this means nothing 
can be construed about the original document from 
its  digest.  The  accepted  cryptographic  hashing 
algorithms are public and are continuously subject to 
scrutiny  by  cryptanalysts  since  they  underlie 
electronic signing mechanisms.  
The  principles  have  been  used  in  a  number  of 
registration  systems,  notably  the  digital  notary 
service operated by Surety [5], which is based upon 
Haber  and  Stornetta's  concept  and  patents.  Also, 
since  1995  a  UK  Jersey-based  company  has  been 
operating its 'Stamper' time-stamping service based 
on PGP signing (IT Consulting [4]). More recently, 
in  the  UK,  Codel  have  been  promoting  their 
Codelmark service [3]. 
The  Surety  and  Codel  services  are  both 
subscription-based  services.  Subscribers  need  to 
have  faith  in  the  company  and  trust  that  their 
processes  are  rigorous  since  the  underlying 
registrations are not open to users' scrutiny. Daily, 
they  digest  the  registration  data  and  publish  the 
resulting  'master  hash'  in  a  newspaper  of  record 
(Codel  publish  in  the  Financial  Times).  ‘Stamper’ 
attempts to be more open by publishing its signing 
summaries on the web and over Usenet. 
Since  the  users'  digests  are  not  disclosing 
anything, it is not clear why it should not be possible 
to openly declare the registrations. This reduces the 
trust barrier to using the system: the users can see 
their  registrations,  their  context  and  watch  the 
scheme function. Further, if they are concerned about 
the robustness of the service, they can take copies of 
sufficient data for safe-keeping elsewhere. 
Though  the  digests  do  not  declare  anything 
interesting about the user, other data recorded with 
the digest could. Subscription services need to know 
whose  data  it  is  in  order  to  secure  their  income 
stream.  They  can  undertake  traffic  analysis  on 
registrations and assign it to users. Even if this data 
is not made public, the registration service needs to 
be trusted not to ever misuse this data. The only sure 
way  of  avoiding  this  risk  is  to  allow  anonymous 
requests  for  service.  Indeed,  there  are  compelling 
human rights and citizenship reasons why anonymity 
is desirable. 
Thus  there  is  a  need  for  an  openly-available 
registration scheme whose only function is to accept 
and  publish  sequences  of  digests  received  from 
anonymous  users.  If  the  user  needs  to  assert  that 
they, or their company, are the only owners of the 
data at the time, then it is for them to incorporate 
some secret in the data before its digest is registered 
(e.g.  using  a  signed  HMAC,  Eastlake  and  Hansen 
[1]).  That  is  an  optional,  separate  issue  from 
registering the existence of the data. 
 
4. The registration scheme 
 
Open declaration of evidence is optimal. Digest 
hashes  are  of  fixed  length,  short  and  are  not 
expensive to store. Publishing these is cheap and web 
technology provides the ideal ‘notice board’ where 
the public can observe them. 
Anyone  with  an  electronic  document  that  they 
wish to register posts its hash on a registration server 
of  their  choice  using  a  protocol  that  supports 
anonymity.  Because  of  the  properties  of 
cryptographic  hashing  algorithms,  the  registrand 
should be able to demonstrate later that only they had 
the means to create the registration at that point in 
the journal. The registration server’s vital task is to 
journal the registrations chronologically. The server 
can  annotate  the  registrations  with  other  data.  An 
obvious and useful choice is a timestamp. However, 
such  timestamps  are  only  indicative:  they  are  not 
essential.  The  scheme  fixes  the  time  order  of 
registrations, which is necessary and sufficient. 
The power and scaleability of the scheme lies in 
realising that a registration server is itself generating 
material  that  needs  evidential  protection.  Thus, 
periodically,  it  hashes  a  journal  segment  and 
registers  that  with  another  disinterested  server. Provided  there  are  sufficient,  randomly  cross-
registering, independently operated servers, the time 
order of registrations across the server network can 
be  adequately  resolved.  Any  timing  information 
embedded  in  the  journals  is  useful,  supplementary 
evidence,  particularly  if  the  timestamps  (or  other 
form of time anchor) come from reputable sources.  
As an example, Figure 1 illustrates what happens 
when  a  user  registers  ‘My  Document’  with  their 
chosen ‘Yellow’ server.  The hash the user generated 
for My Document is stored with other registrations in 
Segment 6 of Yellow’s journal. It returns a receipt to 
the  user  that  is  kept  with  My  Document.    Shortly 
later, Yellow closes its Segment 6 and registers its 
hash  with  itself  in  new  Segment  7  and  the  Green 
server.    This  process  continues  at  indeterminate 
times among other,  disinterested,  cross-registering 
servers.    Note  that  the  effect  of  the  registration 
(network  ‘flow’,  in  graph  terms)  is  felt  twice  in 
Yellow  Segment  7.  This  achieves  stronger 
connectedness    between  the  variously-owned 
segment    nodes    and    distinguishes    this    scheme  
from  those  that    use   hash   trees  to  store 
registrations e.g. [5].  
If  the  user  wishes  to  assert  they  were  in 
possession of My Document at the time claimed the 
registration  process  is  replayed  but  comparing  the 
registration  with  the  evidence  in  Yellow  server 
Segment  6,  as  indicated  by  the  saved  receipt.  For 
clarity,  the  illustration  shows  the  user  making  just 
one registration with one server. For robustness, it is 
wise to register with at least two servers. 
Once  the  hash  of  a  server  journal  segment  is 
released to the network it will rapidly be subsumed 
within further cross-registrations. This locks all the 
dependent  data  into  time  order.  No  other  data  on 
which  the  hash  depends  can  be  altered  without 
potential detection.  
Many, unknown users—notably, the registrands, 
will observe the scheme. Further, these will be taking 
copies  of  relevant  segments  so  that  they  (or  their 
representative)  can  replay  the  algorithms  later  if 
required. Server operators will not know their users 
through  normal  use.  Any  inexplicable  post-hoc 
alteration  or  loss  of  journals  will  cause  potentially 
irreparable damage to their reputation. 
Since  there  must  be  formal  disinterest  between 
servers  and  clients,  there  cannot  be  any  service 
contract and, therefore, the service must be free. This 
poses  some  security  and  resourcing  challenges. 
Fortunately,  hashes  are  small,  and  networks  and 
storage  are  comparatively  cheap.  We  also  have 
precedents  for  the  evolution  of  large,  mutual  self-
interest based systems—Internet and email. 
 
5. The scheme capabilities 
 
The holder of some potential evidence would now 
have  complete  freedom  to  register  its  hash  with 
servers  of  their  choosing.  Since  services  might 
disappear, it is wise to register with several. Service 
operators will have a service policy that would guide 
a user in their choice. Features would be (a) what 
information is recorded with the hash (b) how often 
journal  segments  are  closed  (c)  server  cross-
registration  (graph  connectedness)  (d)  time  anchor 
policy (e) number of registrations per day accepted 
from  a  particular  Internet  source  (f)  open-source 
heritage  (g)  third-party  validation  (h)  certified 
retrieval services etc.  
It is always the users’ responsibility to have the 
means to replay the registration algorithms to a third 
party to prove that they possessed the data at issue at 
the time claimed. This is why it is important that the 
scheme is open and simple. In a dispute, it is still for 
the parties to interpret the meaning the data that was 
registered. What will not be in doubt is (a) document 
possession and (b) its time-order context. 
 
6. Scheme usage scenarios 
 
There  are  many  everyday  applications  where 
voluntary registration of documents would enhance 
trust. Citizen-consumers are being asked to react to 
documents that are only published on web sites. To 
be sure that the document does not change without 
notice,  either  party  can  register  the  document  on 
which they are basing their business decisions. For 
NR to be credible, a disinterested third party must 
hold the registration. And just having the ability to 
make registrations enhances trust between parties. 
There  is  considerable  commercial  pressure  to 
move to paperless banking and billing. Traditionally, 
NR relies on the infeasibility of undetectably altering 
or  forging  paper  documents.  Instead,  the  issuing 
party would register the electronic document when 








































































































































Figure 1. Registering among net-connected serversOnce third-party registered the document cannot be 
subsequently altered without giving explicit notice. 
The  recipient  would  be  told  the  locus  of  its 
registration  so  that,  upon  receipt,  the  registration 
process can be replayed. The recipient can then be 
sure  that  what  they  received  the  sender  will  not 
repudiate—the data was what the sender wanted to 
communicate at the time it was issued. The recipient 
may  subsequently  wish  to  register  what  they 
received,  thus  capturing  the  time  path  of  the 
document. Of course, both parties must keep the data 
in a way that they are able to replay the registration 
process to a third party evidence reviewer. Figure 2 
shows how the two parties could act to ensure fair 
play.  The  document  here  could  be  a  shareholders’ 
report, bank statement or contract. 
Figure 3 shows how a research organisation can 
run  a  local  registration  service  to  concentrate  the 
registration traffic before using a third party service. 
The advantages of doing this are (a) encouraging the 
IP  developers  to  use  the  service  regularly  and  (b) 
mitigating traffic analysis by outside parties. Because 
the primary server is internal to the organisation, its 
evidential  robustness  would  be  more  in  question. 
However,  the  IP  Administration  can  dynamically 
adapt its own registration policies to suit the risks. 
Digital  rights  management  (DRM)  is  where  the 
document can only be rendered with permission of 
the  owner  (e.g.  music,  video,  cartography).  This 
requires the cooperation of the data renderers regards 
encryption  system  management.  DRM  has  so 
irritated  end-users  that  many  schemes  have  been 
willfully broken. An alternative is to register the IP 
as it evolves and gets distributed rather as it is done 
in other IP disciplines. This establishes prior-art and 
any  further  registration  will  establish  a  time  path, 
perhaps through licensed, selling intermediaries. Any 
challenge along the path will require the holder of 
the document to demonstrate that they acquired the 
necessary  rights.  Figure  4  shows  how  this  may  be 
achieved. The principle is that any holder of IP will 
have a matching document that shows that they have 
the right to hold and use it. 
Clearly, the digital product data may have many 
incarnations/versions  with  different  hashes.  It  will 
still be for the reviewer to judge whether a material 
breach of rights has occurred. Here, registering does 
not  change  the  process  of  disputing  misuse,  but  it 
does  make  ‘copyright  depositing’  very  easy  for 
everyone—corporation  or  citizen.  Because  either 
party can freely register their data, those who believe 
they rightfully own a copy will want to register it. 
Not registering a copy will question the individual’s 
motives. Just knowing that anyone can cheaply and 
robustly assert possession of some data, be it their 






















































































































Both Parties must retain their document+receipt pair
so that they can replay the registration process
For clarity, only one registration per document is shown.
Registration with several servers is recommended.
Party B may choose





which is believed to be
the same as Party A’s
If offered, replay and match
with Party A’s claimed
registration receipt.















Figure 2. Confirmation of the state of a document7. Conclusion and next steps 
 
An open scheme that should enhance the ability 
of  citizens  or  workers  to  collaborate  with  trust  is 
proposed.  The  time  is  right  for  its  widespread 
adoption  so  that  it  can  start  to  enable  the  benefits 
claimed.  A  very  simple  demonstrator  can  be 
accessed at Probity [6] which readers are invited to 
try. This uses HTTP to effect registrations.  
Work  is  in  progress  in  developing  open-source 
client and server prototypes to be used within the UK 
eScience support infrastructure (notably ePrints and 
MyExperiment). There is scope for ‘added value’ in 
embedding  the  registration  primitives  within  tools 
where  NR  could  be  useful.  Those  with  server 
resources and interest are invited to join the effort 
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